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Abstract
Effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts depend on comprehensive risk
assessments that consider potential hazard events and social vulnerability. The Lake
Nyos Disaster (LND) caused the deaths of about 1,700 people, forced another 4,000
people from their homes, and left survivors more vulnerable to future hazards. There is
considerable research on the gas hazard and some work on local vulnerability;
however studies rarely consider both aspects of disaster risk (DR). This study
addresses both the hazard and vulnerability and uses qualitative and quantitative
methods that are applied for the first time to LND survivor vulnerability and gas
hazard. Interviews, participant observation, the Pressure and Release (PAR) and
Access models are used to analyze vulnerability. A modified LAHARZ model and
GIS mapping are used to categorize the gas hazard. By modeling various gas release
scenarios and determining the main factors affecting vulnerability, DR for survivors in
the Nyos area is calculated.

ix

1.

Introduction
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is being increasingly recognized as an important

development goal in many countries as well as in international and intergovernmental
organizations. Natural hazards are complex problems which are happening more
frequently due to increased exposure to hazards, increased vulnerability in urban areas,
global climate change, and other reasons. It is because of the continually growing risk
of natural hazards that both hazard and vulnerability assessments are becoming
increasingly significant to DRR efforts. A comprehensive risk assessment considers the
full range of potential disaster events and the underlying drivers that contribute to
vulnerability. It may start with the analysis of historical events and influences, as well
as incorporating forward-looking perspectives and integrating the anticipated impacts
of phenomena that are altering historical trends such as climate change. It is well
recognized that risk is not static and that it can change very rapidly as a result of
evolving hazards, exposure, and vulnerability. This is why it is vital to consider all of
these factors when defining disaster risk.
Disasters are the combination of one or more hazards and human behaviors and
actions. A disaster is defined as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community
or society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses
and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope
with using its own resources.” (UNISDR, 2017). Disasters can be evaluated as the
product of long term processes which create risk over many years, decades, or longer.
According to Wisner et al. (2004), disaster risk is the result of the interaction of one or
more hazards with a vulnerable population. A disaster cannot occur without both of
these dynamics. There is no disaster if there is a hazard but no vulnerable population or
if there is a vulnerable population but no hazard event. A population is vulnerable when
their characteristics and situation influence their capacity to anticipate, resist, cope
with, and recover from the impacts of a natural hazard (Wisner et al., 2004). Natural
hazards are extreme natural events and processes which are categorized by their
varying degrees of severity and frequency.
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The 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster (LND) significantly impacted the populations
living in the affected areas. The lake experienced a limnic eruption and released a
cloud of CO₂ into the valleys around the lake. The disaster killed over 1,700 people,
displaced more than 4,000, and killed many domestic and wild animals (Tuttle et al.,
1987). Survivors were evacuated, after which aid and mitigation efforts began. There
have been many studies done on the LND focusing mainly on the hazard’s origin,
trigger, and the composition and structure of the gas and water in the lake. However,
less research has been devoted to the exposure, risk, and social vulnerability of those
affected.
This study aims to understand disaster risk in the Lake Nyos area by looking at
the effects of the gas hazard and socially produced vulnerability on the populations
affected by the LND. Hazard and vulnerability assessments were produced for this
study. Data was gathered from interviews, participant observation, review of literature,
and satellite imagery. The theoretical frameworks and models used to analyze the
hazard and vulnerability include the Pressure and Release model, Access model, an
adapted LAHARZ model, and ArcMap. The object of this study is to determine the
disaster risk for LND survivors in the Lake Nyos area, as well as understand the
impacts of various gas release scenarios. It will also be determined how a risk
assessment based on these methods could inform policy and DRR efforts in the Nyos
area. Hazard and vulnerability assessment studies such as this can be used to establish
priorities when addressing hazards and vulnerability.

1.1 Geological Setting and Study Location
Cameroon is located on the west coast of Africa, on the Gulf of Guinea, and sits
on a line of young (Tertiary to Recent) volcanic activity which trends NE-SW across
Cameroon (Schlüter, 2008). This line of volcanism is the Cameroon Volcanic Line
(CVL) which extends for 1,600km from the island of Pagalu (aka Annobón), in the
Atlantic Ocean, through the Gulf of Guinea, and along the Cameroon-Nigeria border
(Fitton, 1980). The geography of Cameroon varies greatly across the country’s
475,440km2 (CIA, 2017). The country includes a variety of climatic zones ranging from
2

tropical rainforests to hot semi-arid climates (Sahel). Due to its diverse climates and
varied geology, Cameroon is exposed to a wide variety of climatological, geological,
biological, and ecological hazards. Some of the most well-known natural hazard events
in Cameroon have been caused by Mount Cameroon, a stratovolcano in the Southwest
Region, and by Lake Monoun in the West Region and Lake Nyos in the Northwest
Region.
The landscape of the Northwest Region of Cameroon is defined by features of
the CVL. There are old cinder cones, lava flows, and many crater lakes which have
formed in the circular maars caused by volcanic explosions (Kling et al., 1987; Tuttle et
al., 1987). Lake Nyos and Lake Monoun also sit on the CVL and contain high
concentrations of carbon dioxide. Large emissions of CO₂ have occurred at each of
these lakes, at Lake Monoun in August 1984 and at Lake Nyos in August 1986 (Kling
et al., 1987). The 1986 LND caused the deaths of over 1,700 people in the villages of
Nyos, Cha, Subum, as well as the surrounding areas. This study focuses on the hazard
that caused this disaster, the vulnerability of the people affected by it, and the disaster
risk constructed by these factors.

3

Figure 1: Location map for Lake Nyos and Lake Monoun and other features along the
CVL (Ohba et al., 2013).
Lake Nyos, located approximately 500km by road from Cameroon’s capital of
Yaoundé, is a crater lake in Menchum Division. The lake is 208m at its deepest point.
Underlying basement rock has distinct fault lines running through it, which have been
active in the area’s recent history (Freeth & Rex, 2000; Kling, 1987). The Nyos maar
was formed by volcanic explosions and the collapse of adjacent rocks (Tuttle et al.,
1987). Beneath the maar is a diatreme, or an approximately vertical tube that formed
above a dike and is packed with disjointed rock fragments and ash (Kling et al., 1987).
The CO₂ present in the lake is released by the melting of the metasomatized mantle
deep below the lake and seeps into the bottom waters of the lake dissolved in
groundwater (Aka, 2015; Kling et al., 1987; Nojiri et al., 1993). Based on
measurements and evidence collected after the 1986 event by the USGS and
4

corroborated by subsequent studies, it was determined that Lake Nyos still posed a
threat to the surrounding communities because there remained the potential for gas
eruptions in the future (Lockwood & Rubin, 1989; Nojiri et al., 1993; Tuttle et al.,
1987). This led to the evacuation of the area and the relocation of the inhabitants into
resettlement camps outside of the disaster zone: Buabua, Esu, Ipalim, Kimbi, Kumfutu,
Upkwa, and Yemnge.
The area of interest (AOI) is located on the border of the Menchum and Boyo
Divisions in the Northwest Region of Cameroon, 120km north of Bamenda, the
region’s capital (Figure 2). Menchum Division (4,469km²) and Boyo Division
(1,592km²), of which Wum and Fundong are the divisional headquarters respectively,
have a total population of about 325,000 people. These divisions are made up mostly of
rural agricultural communities with only a few large economic and political centers.
There are many small communities in Menchum and Boyo Divisions and their
populations are concentrated in small communities that are widely dispersed across the
divisions. The villages of Nyos and Cha and the resettlement camps of Upkwa, Esu,
Ipalim, Kumfutu, and Yemnge are in Menchum Division, while the village of Subum
and the resettlement camps of Kimbi and Buabua are in Boyo Division. Subsistence
farming, cattle grazing, and petty trading are the primary occupations of the majority of
community members.

5

Figure 2: Study location, AOI (red line) and the locations of Cha, Nyos, Subum, and
Buabua (green points).

1.2 Overview of Recent Socio-economic and Political History of
Cameroon
The Republic of Cameroon has a population of about 23 million and is known
for its cultural and environmental diversity (CIA, 2017). Often called “Africa in
miniature”, French and English are the official languages of Cameroon though West
African Pidjin English and at least 240 national languages are also spoken (Biloa &
6

Echu, 2008; Republic of Cameroon, 2018). The country is divided into ten
administrative regions, the Extreme-North, North, Adamawa, East, Center, South,
Littoral, West, Southwest, and Northwest. Cameroon ranks 153rd out of 188 countries
on the global human development index (HDI) scale putting the country in the low
human development category (UNDP, 2016). The 2015 HDI for Cameroon, 0.518, is
below the 0.523 average HDI for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; however it is above
the 0.497 average of countries in the low human development category (UNDP, 2016).
The Southwest and Northwest Regions are anglophone and the rest of the
regions are francophone. There are more than 240 ethno-linguistic groups in Cameroon
that are part of the three main language groups, the Bantu, the Semi-Bantu, and the
Sudanese (Republic of Cameroon, 2018). A variety of religions are practiced in
Cameroon, the two most prevalent being Christianity and Islam. Many people practice
animism and other traditional belief systems in conjunction with their Christian,
Islamic, or other non-traditional beliefs.
In the 15th century, Portuguese traders established contact with the area that is
now Cameroon and though no permanent settlements were maintained, slaves were
purchased from the local peoples (Worger et al., 2010). In 1884, the region came under
German rule after protectorate treaties were negotiated with local chiefs (Hargreaves,
1990). This region was invaded by French and British forces during WWI. After the
war, former German-controlled Cameroon was divided between the United Kingdom
and France (Hargreaves, 1990).
In 1946, the recognition of emerging political parties established a basis for
Cameroonian nationalism (Atangana, 2010; Lewis, 1965; Ndille & Rose, 2016; Worger
et al., 2010). The Union of Cameroon Peoples (UPC), one of the many emerging
parties, demanded immediate reunification of British-controlled Cameroon and Frenchcontrolled Cameroon along with eventual independence (Konings, 1996, 1999;
Stevenson, 2008). In 1957, the French government created the autonomous state of
Cameroon basing its government on French parliamentary democracy. In 1958, the
Legislative Assembly of Cameroon voted to gain independence by 1960 and obtained
full internal autonomy in 1959. Ahmadou Ahidjo became prime minister of French7

controlled Cameroon and John Foncha became prime minister of British-controlled
Cameroon. Soon Foncha and Ahidjo were discussing the possibility of unification upon
attaining independence (Achankeng, 2015; Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).
On January 1, 1960, Cameroon became an independent republic and in April
1960, Ahidjo's UPC party won a majority and Ahidjo, who ran unopposed, was elected
president. During 1960, discussions between Foncha and Ahidjo continued, and a
future federation was tentatively outlined. In 1961, a vote organized by the United
Nations was held in British-controlled Cameroon and the people chose either to be part
of the independent Nigerian state or to be reunified with the independent Republic of
Cameroon. The predominantly Muslim northern section of British-controlled Cameroon
voted to join Nigeria and the largely Christian southern section voted to join the
Republic of Cameroon, which then became the Federal Republic of Cameroon
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997, 2003). The previously British-controlled part of
Cameroon became known as West Cameroon and the French part as East Cameroon.
Ahidjo accepted the federation, considering it a stepping stone towards full
reunification (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). The federal constitution was adopted, with
Ahidjo as president and Foncha as vice president. Buea became the capital of West
Cameroon, while Yaoundé doubled as the federal capital and the capital of East
Cameroon (Figure 3). East Cameroon and West Cameroon retained substantial
autonomy and continued following the rules and laws of their respective colonizers
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

8

Figure 3: Map of regional capitals in Cameroon. Map provided courtesy of the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (Retrieved from
https://reliefweb.int/map/cameroon/cameroon-location-map-2013).
In 1972, a new constitution replaced the federation with a unitary state called
the United Republic of Cameroon (Figure 4). In 1975, Paul Biya was appointed vice
president. Ahidjo resigned as president in 1982 and was constitutionally succeeded by
Biya. Ahidjo later regretted his choice of successor and in a coup in 1984, his
supporters failed to overthrow Biya (Akum, 2009). Biya won single-candidate elections
in 1983 and 1984 and the country returned to being named the Republic of Cameroon.
According to the U.S. Department of State Cameroon Human Rights Reports from
2011 and 2017, Biya has remained in power, winning non-transparent multiparty
9

elections in 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011. His Cameroon People’s Democratic
Movement (CPDM) party continues to hold a sizeable majority in the legislature.

Figure 4: Cameroon's changing borders throughout recent history. "Cameroon
boundary Changes" by Roke is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0.
Politically, Cameroon is a republic in which the presidency has a central role in
terms of political power and has control over all branches of the government
(Department of State, 2017). Although the country has a multiparty system, the CPDM
has remained in power since its foundation in 1985. Paul Biya has been president of
Cameroon since 1982 (Department of State, 2017). The government of Cameroon is
centralized, each subsequent level of government has less and less decision making
power; most decisions for villages, subdivisions, divisions, etc. are made at higher
presiding levels (Bang, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014).

10

2.

Background

2.1 Previous Work
The LND inspired many scientists and researchers to delve into various aspects
of the disaster, hazard, and its effects. The largest portion of these studies focus on the
hazard’s origin, trigger mechanism, and the composition and structure of the gas and
water in the lake. Initial studies conducted on the disaster and its origin detailed the
extent of the gas flow and found that the gas released was primarily CO₂ originating
from a deep-seated magmatic source beneath the lake (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter
et al., 1989; Morin & Pahai, 1986; Tuttle et al., 1987). The chemical and medical
evidence from investigations conducted after the disaster showed that the victims died
of CO₂ asphyxiation (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter et al., 1989; Kling et al., 1987). It
was also determined that although the CO₂ is originating from a magmatic source, the
release of gas was not directly caused by volcanic activity (Aka, 2015; Tuttle et al.,
1987).
In order to better understand the hazard, researchers considered the trigger
mechanism that caused the eruption as well as the composition of the gas and lake
stratification. Studies considered internal and external mechanisms such as landslides,
turnover, volcanic eruptions, seasonal mixing and density inversion (Chau et al., 1996;
Cotel, 1999; Kling et al., 1987; Kling et al., 1994; Touret et al., 2010; Tuttle et al.,
1987). Little consensus exists on the exact trigger mechanism for the 1986 gas release,
though a small landslide is often cited as a possible cause. It is, however, usually agreed
upon that a disruption of the lake’s stratification decreased pressure on the bottom
layers and released the gas (Kling et al., 1987; Tuttle et al., 1987). Additionally,
subsequent studies found that gas continues to accumulate in the bottom water of the
lake, creating a potential hazard (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994; Nojiri et al.,
1993). Sano et al. (1990), Nojiri et al. (1993), and Kusakabe et al. (2000) all found that
though there was a continuous influx of CO₂ into the lake, the gas build-up process is
not dominated by a steady-state flux and that this makes it difficult to estimate how
often degassing events might occur.
11

Numerous studies considering mitigation approaches and various modeling
techniques examine possible hazard reduction strategies. Degassing the lake was
suggested immediately after the LND and was followed up with studies investigating
the safety of possible procedures and methods (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994;
Kling et al., 1987; Kling et al., 1994; Kusakabe et al., 2000; Tuttle et al., 1987). Later,
Schmid et al. (2006) also examined CO₂ concentrations and stratification in the lake to
determine the effect of the degassing mitigation strategy. Results showed that without
degassing the CO₂ would reach levels as high as or higher than pre-disaster levels.
Mapping and modeling of the LND gas flow was done after the disaster in order
to assist possible mitigation efforts (McCord & Schladow, 1998; Pierret et al., 1992).
More recently studies attempting to model the LND and possible future gas releases
been done using a variety of computer and weather prediction modeling techniques
(Burton et al., 2017; Costa & Chiodini, 2015; Folch et al., 2017). These models have
variable levels of success in matching the dispersion pattern of the gas during the LND.
The mapping and modeling studies, along with considering possible mitigation efforts,
also investigate exposure. Work done shortly after and since the disaster probes into
risk due to exposure to the hazard (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter et al., 1989; Le
Guern et al., 1992; Tchindjang, 2018). These studies consider risk based mainly on
physical exposure and less on vulnerability and how that affects the disaster risk. The
survivors’ vulnerability at the time of the disaster was examined by Shanklin (1988,
1989) and Le Guern et al. (1992). Their studies found that many survivors lost their
livelihoods and social support networks in the disaster. Bang (2008, 2009, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2016) has delved deeper into social vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area than
many of his predecessors. He also conducted a study on social vulnerability in the Lake
Nyos area using the Sustainable Livelihoods framework. This framework however does
not equally consider the hazard and vulnerability, both of which are important aspects
of DR. Bang’s work has shown that the people’s vulnerability and the disaster risk in
the area are formed by a variety of factors and stresses the importance of addressing
more than the physical hazard.
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2.2 The 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster (LND)
2.2.1 The Event
On the night of August 21st 1986, a limnic eruption occurred at Lake Nyos,
which released a dense cloud of CO₂ into the surrounding valleys (Kling et al., 1987).
The gas mainly affected the villages of Nyos, Cha, and Subum and the surrounding
areas. The disaster caused the deaths of over 1,700 people and displaced more than
4,000 others (Tuttle et al., 1987). Livestock and local fauna were also significantly
impacted, about 3,500 cattle died as well as many other domesticated and wild animals
(Tuttle et al., 1987). This was a significant loss for the people living in the area since
agriculture and cattle grazing were the main livelihoods for a substantial portion of the
population. In a single night many people living in the Nyos area lost both their
livelihoods and their families.
The morning after the disaster people from neighboring villages, outside the
affected area, discovered that something had happened and began to assist survivors.
The area was evacuated; survivors who were able fled the area while others were
assisted by people from neighboring, unaffected villages, missions, and the
government. It took longer for a formal response because of the area’s relative isolation
and distance from cities with suitable resources. The government and NGO responders
arrived a few days after the disaster and, over the next days and weeks, finished
evacuating the area and burying the dead.
2.2.2 Response and Management
Disaster management in Cameroon is very centralized (Bang, 2012, 2014). The
response and management of the LND started at the national level with a presidential
decree creating a National Committee for the Reception and Management of Relief
Aid. Then a ministerial decree created provincial committees, one in Douala to manage
foreign aid and another in Bamenda to manage national aid coming into the region
(Bang, 2012). International and local NGOs were not included in the committees
(Bang, 2012; Othman‐Chandev, 1987). At the regional level, the disaster was managed
by a government committee overseen by the governor of the Northwest Region in
13

Bamenda. Then at the divisional level, a committee was formed and was directed by the
senior divisional officer (SDO) of Menchum in Wum. This committee was finally
responsible for the evacuation of survivors from the disaster zone (Bang, 2012;
Othman‐Chandev, 1987). The official response and evacuation was able to begin a few
days after the eruption, when it was determined that the area no longer posed any
immediate risks. The military was also deployed to the disaster zone to assist since they
had vehicles that could handle the poor road conditions (Bang, 2012; Krajick, 2003;
Othman‐Chandev, 1987). Since the Nyos area did not have health facilities, many of
the survivors were taken to the hospital in Wum, Nkambe, and other villages farther
along the Ring Road.
After the evacuation, the government and local people worked to bury all those
who had died and the survivors were housed in temporary tent camps (Bang, 2009).
Daily necessities were provided for the survivors by missionaries, international aid
organizations, local citizens, NGOs, and the government of Cameroon. Two years after
the disaster, resettlement camps were established by the government with assistance
from non-governmental organizations and individuals to relocate the survivors from the
affected villages and the surrounding area to safe areas outside of the disaster zone. The
permanent resettlement camps were built and the survivors were moved into these
about two years after the disaster had forced them from their homes (Bang, 2009).
In the decades following the disaster, the government and international aid
continued sporadically. According to some interviews with community members, aid
stopped coming a few years after the disaster and is no longer being distributed. This, in
addition to perceived benefits of living in the villages near the lake, has prompted many
of the survivors to move back to the disaster zone (Bang, 2009; Bang & Few, 2012).
Though the disaster zone was reopened for habitation by the government in 2014, most
of the survivors who have moved back did so long before this announcement and only a
few interview respondents were aware of the announcement.
Disaster response tasks for the LND were inhibited by the lack of agency
capacity as well as the distance of government agencies and their resources from the
lake. The disaster spurred the government to strengthen its disaster aid and response
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capabilities. However, the government agencies are still very centralized and this makes
them less effective in mitigating and responding to hazard events (Aka et al., 2017;
Bang, 2012, 2013, 2014; Gaston et al., 2012).
In Cameroon, the responsibilities of disaster and risk management are shared by
several agencies that work in conjunction with international organizations, NGOs, and
scientists (Tchindjang, 2018). The hierarchy of these agencies and organizations, as
described by Tchindjang (2018), is depicted in Figure 5. The Directorate of Civil
Protection (DPC) manages response efforts and coordinates between the necessary
administrations. However, the Department of Civil Protection of the Ministry of
Territorial Administration and Decentralization (DPC/MINATD) is the organization
that actually works with and coordinates disaster management with the various other
agencies. The offices and agencies that collaborate on disaster management and
response are the Institute of Geological and Mining Research (IRGM), the National
Institute of Cartography (INC), the Ministry of Public Health (MINSANTE), and the
National Fire Brigade Corps, not to mention various UN, WHO, and Red Cross
representatives (MINATD/DCP, 2009; Tchindjang, 2018).

Figure 5: Hierarchy of disaster management in Cameroon.
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2.2.3 Mitigation
After the disaster, it was determined that the lake still posed a threat to people
living in the areas surrounding the lake, which led to the suggestion that the lake be
degassed in order to mitigate the hazard (Tuttle et al., 1987). Studies showed that the
level of CO₂ in Lake Nyos was quickly increasing. It was estimated that within 15 - 30
years the lake would be recharged with more CO₂ than was present before the LND
(Evans et al., 1994; Kantha & Freeth, 1996; Kling et al., 1994; McCord & Schladow,
1998; Nojiri et al., 1993). Although suggested at the time of the disaster, degassing did
not start for another 15 years (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994; Kling et al., 1994;
Kusakabe et al., 2008).
In 2001, with the CO₂ at its highest recorded level, degassing began at Lake
Nyos (Kusakabe, 2017). The project started with one degassing pipe though it quickly
became clear that more pipes would be needed to mitigate the hazard (Halbwachs &
Sabroux, 2001; Halbwachs et al., 2004; Kling et al., 2005; Schmid et al., 2006). Two
more pipes were installed in 2011 which reduced the total gas content to 40% of the
level it was in 2001, though there was still a significant amount of gas in the lake
(Evans et al., 2012).
Since the disaster, the technical management of the CO₂ hazard and the
degassing has been conducted by international organizations and scientists in
collaboration with Cameroonian agencies and scientists (Bang, 2012; Kusakabe, 2017;
Tchindjang, 2018). Technical expertise of the hazard is provided by Cameroonian
scientists and research institutions based in Yaoundé and they remotely monitor the
lake from there.
The government disaster managers focused on the technical aspects of the
disaster during its management and mitigation, though local groups and organizations
near the disaster area noticed that the survivors had suffered great socio-economic
losses that were not being addressed. They were now living in poorer conditions, their
family ties and social networks had been broken by the disaster, and that the small
parcels of land allotted to each family living in the camps had created tensions over
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farming space (Bang, 2012). These socio-economic factors of vulnerability have yet to
be fully addressed.
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3.

Methods
Disaster risk (DR) is the interaction of a hazard with a vulnerable population;

therefore both the specific hazard and vulnerability were characterized for this study. It
is necessary to examine these two sets of opposing factors of DR in order to understand
how it is constructed and what DRR measures might be most effective. Individual
interviews and participant observation were used to gather data for the vulnerability
analysis while satellite images were used for the hazard analysis. Literature review and
primary document review were used to gather data for both analyses. The Pressure and
Release model and Access model were used to analyze the vulnerability of the LND
survivors. The gas hazard was analyzed using an adapted LAHARZ model in
MATLAB R2018a and ArcMap 10.5.1. The results of the vulnerability and hazard
analyses were used to rank the various factors of survivor vulnerability and the gas
hazard and used with a risk matrix to determine DR.

3.1 Data Collection
The researcher lived and worked in Cameroon for just over two years as a Peace
Corps Volunteer (PCV). For more than a year and a half of that time the researcher was
located in Bamenda in the Northwest Region. During that time the researcher made
frequent trips to villages in and around the Nyos area. On these trips the researcher
collaborated on various projects with other PCVs and local schools, NGOs, farmers,
and farming groups.
Interviews for this study were conducted over eight weeks, from October to
November 2015, in the Mezam, Menchum, and Boyo Divisions of the Northwest
Region of Cameroon. These divisions contain the villages, resettlement camps, and
offices of government and non-governmental organizations where interview
respondents were living and working. The research project [#799717-1] was approved
through expedited review by the Michigan Technological University Institutional
Review Board (IRB). There were 88 semi-structured interviews conducted to
investigate the circumstances, actions, and perceptions of the survivors of the 1986
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Lake Nyos Disaster (LND). In addition to interviews, field and participant observation
and review of literature and primary documents were used to gather data for the study.
Interviews were done individually with survivors of the LND living in the three villages
most affected by the disaster, the seven resettlement camps, as well as with government
and NGO representatives who were or have been involved in the management of the
LND.
The interview guide was made up of ten open-ended questions (see Appendix
A). Respondents discussed their personal and survivor perceptions of the formal and
informal responses, management, and mitigation of the LND as well as their personal
and survivor actions and circumstances before, during, and since the disaster. The guide
was adjusted for the individual interviews with government and NGO representatives
so that they could assist in verifying the timeline of events and clarifying the level and
nature of their personal and organizational involvement in the disaster response and
management. To ensure the protection of each respondent’s confidentiality, all of their
identities were coded and no personally identifiable information was collected. RCA
Digital Voice recorders were used to record the interviews for translation and
transcription later on.
The interviews were conducted in English, West African Pidjin English,
Fulfulde, and Hausa. This way the respondents could hear and respond to the questions
in a language with which they were comfortable. Two local translators, who are fluent
in these languages, were trained by the researcher and assisted with conducting and
translating the interviews. The researcher was present at every interview to observe and
take notes as well as certify that the IRB approved project protocol was properly
conducted. The translators were employed to ensure accurate translation and
interpretation of the interviews as well as to assist with proper conduct of local
protocols, which often varied between communities and ethno-linguistic groups within
the study area.
The interviews utilized open-ended questions and “snowball” sampling
techniques to obtain a wider variety of viewpoints and larger number of qualified
respondents. The interviews used open-ended questions to allow respondents to talk
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about what they know and not be influenced by the researcher’s opinions (Morgan et
al., 1992). This method allows respondents to discuss a topic as much or as little as they
wish and to feel free to share any information that they feel is relevant or important
even beyond the exact topic of the question. It also allows the conversation to carry on
longer when a respondent has more information or knowledge about a certain topic.
The sampling method, “snowball” sampling, is done by asking key individuals and
respondents to suggest people who may be good candidates for the research until no
new candidates are suggested (Bernard, 2006). To incorporate a wider variety of
viewpoints, men and women of each ethno-linguistic group present in each location
were interviewed.
Later the transcribed interviews, literature, primary documents, and field notes
were compiled, organized, and coded by hand to identify themes, connections, and to
categorize relevant and recurring information in order to assist with analysis. The
information from field notes, literature and primary document review, participant
observation, and the interviews was compared and cross-referenced. This ensured the
quality and accuracy of the data and information that was collected.

3.2 Vulnerability Assessment
This study used the Pressure and Release (PAR) model and Access model
(Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2012) to assess the vulnerability of survivors in
communities in the Lake Nyos area. In the PAR model, the progression of vulnerability
and hazards converge to define the disaster risk of a community. This model considers
a wide range of factors affecting vulnerability and goes beyond physical exposure and
losses. This model is complimented by the Access model, which examines the
circumstances, actions, and responses of a population affected by a disaster event. The
Access model comes in where the progression of vulnerability and hazards meet to
describe and elaborate on how ‘normal life’ is affected and how it changes throughout
the disaster process. The use of these two models allows for the consideration of
different factors that affect vulnerability in the study area and which factors play the
largest role in that vulnerability. Data for the models came from the interviews, field
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notes from participant observation, literature review, and primary documents. An open
coding process that utilized inductive and deductive thematic analysis was used to
identify themes and common threads and ideas in these data sets (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008;
Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). First inductive coding was used to elicit data-driven
themes. Then, to ensure that all relevant points had been described, the data sets were
coded again deductively using themes from the original PAR model, Access model,
interviews, field notes, and literature.
3.2.1 PAR Model
The PAR model (Figure 6) has two converging sets of factors: the progression
of vulnerability and the hazard. The progression of vulnerability has different levels of
causal factors. At the overarching level are the root causes, resulting in dynamic
pressures at an intermediate level, and fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations at the
local level.
The analysis began at the point of convergence; the unsafe conditions were
described and enumerated using the various coded data sets. The fragile livelihoods and
unsafe locations were examined first because they are the links between socially
produced vulnerability and hazards. The local level factors are also the most apparent
since they directly affect daily life and decision-making. Continuing outward, in the
opposite direction of the progression of vulnerability, the dynamic pressures were
assessed in the same manner as the unsafe conditions. The dynamic pressures help
explain and underscore the impact of root causes on current unsafe conditions. The root
causes were examined last since a large part of the information needed for these factors
came from literature review. It was also helpful to understand the way these factors
have established a foundation and produced the dynamic pressures, macro-forces, and
unsafe conditions in the area.
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Figure 6: PAR model from Wisner et al. (2012).
The PAR model was used for identifying and classifying the different factors
affecting survivor vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area. By considering these factors this
way, a “chain of explanation” can be seen and examined. The model helps discover
how the vulnerabilities affecting risk are manifesting. This information can help
determine possible courses of action for DRR as well as ensure that mitigation and
DRR strategies that are attempted address the underlying causes of local vulnerability.
3.2.2 Access Model
The Access model (Figure 7) was used to organize and examine the anecdotal
evidence from interview data. This model was used to investigate how the respondents’
lives and livelihoods were affected by the LND and at what point in the disaster process
these aspects were affected. The Access model shows how different vulnerability
factors and resource access from the PAR model are affected during a disaster event.
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By examining these changes, the factors that are the more fragile factors can be
identified. Data from interviews, participant observation, and literature review were
used to examine how the disaster affected various aspects of survivors’ lives at the
triggering of the disaster and during the disaster in process.
The Access model is iterative which allows each iteration of the disaster process
and its effects on resource access and livelihoods to be studied. There are four general
stages depicted in the model and described by Wisner et al. (2004). The first stage is
‘normal Life’ (Boxes 1 & 2); the combination of unsafe conditions and livelihoods,
level of access to resources, how resources are used, and decision-making on potential
investments. Social relations and structures of domination act on and construct ‘normal
life’ and unsafe conditions. The trigger event (Box 5) occurs when the time and space
factors of the gas hazard (Boxes 3 & 4) and ‘normal life’ come together in the second
stage. This stage is the transition to disaster (Box 6) where the first impacts, after being
counteracted by any available social protections, start to affect the various aspects of
‘normal life’. The third stage is the disaster in process (Box 7), which considers the
reactions and coping strategies that are used to adapt to new conditions. The new
conditions, coping strategies, and social protections then interact with interventions and
actions taken for disaster reduction (if any) in stage four (Box 8). Stage four starts a
new cycle with ‘normal life’ now including the changed or addressed factors. It
describes the new combination of unsafe conditions and livelihoods, level of access to
resources, investment opportunity decisions, and how resources are used. The outcome
can be a safer, more secure ‘normal life’, one that is essentially equivalent to life before
the disaster, or a less safe and secure life. In other words, the vulnerability of a
population may decrease, stay the same, or increase through each iteration a disaster
event. The features of the new ‘normal life’ depend on which actions are taken or not
taken to improve safety and secure livelihoods after a disaster.
Since the Access model is iterative, it was used to observe the changes in access
to resources and livelihoods of survivors during and after the LND. It was also used to
observe the potential effects of the modeled gas eruption scenarios on current, survivor
vulnerability in the Nyos area.
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Figure 7: The Access model from Wisner et al. (2004).
The Access model examines how the survivors’ livelihoods, access to resources,
and decision-making changed throughout the disaster process. The interviews
conducted with the government and NGO workers assisted in relating and connecting
all of the information gathered from the interview data. This model provides the
connecting point between the hazard and the progression of vulnerability.

3.3 Hazard Assessment
This study utilized an adapted LAHARZ model in MATLAB R2018a and
ArcMap 10.5.1 to categorize the gas hazard posed by Lake Nyos. Both the potential
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flow extent and affected populations were determined for a set of 15 gas release
scenarios. The adapted LAHARZ model, which was adapted from the LAHARZ model
from Iverson et al. (1998); Schilling (1998), was used to find inundation patterns
similar to the LND and for a variety of gas release scenarios. Using a linear regression
model, derived from the LND inundation pattern, the extent of each scenario’s flow
was calculated. By mapping the gas flow patterns in ArcMap, potential affected
populations were found for each scenario.
3.3.1 Mapping
All of the houses within the AOI were mapped using Google Earth Pro and
ArcMap 10.5.1. While running the model and mapping the scenarios, it was found that
several of the scenarios extended past the AOI boundary. The houses that were
considered affected by the gas flows in these scenarios were mapped so that the
affected populations could be calculated. The images used for mapping were all from
2015 or later, most are from 2017 and 2018. Each house which was partially or
completely overlapped by a modeled gas flow scenario was considered to be affected.
The total population affected by a scenario was found by multiplying the number of
houses affected by the average household size (hhs). The national average household
size in Cameroon is five people and in rural areas is it eight people per household
(Balgah et al., 2016; Ngwa & Balgah, 2016). A base model was created to simulate
what a disaster equivalent to the LND would be like today.
3.3.2 Modeling
There were 15 scenarios modeled for this study. To do this, a base model was
created using maps and point data (showing percent lethality in surveyed households)
of the LND from the literature (Figure 8) (Sigurdsson, 1988; Sigurdsson et al., 1987;
Stupfel & Le Guern, 1989). Since the maps did not completely agree on what areas the
gas flow covered, the lethality point data was used to adjust the maps so that they
agreed with the point data. Then the maps were combined to make a single map of the
LND on which to test the model. The model was run using a variety of cross-sectional
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areas. Starting at the lake edge, the cross-sectional area that best fit the extent of the
LND flow was taken at 500m intervals. This was done for the east and west arm of the
flow. These measurements were then plotted in a scatter plot by distance from the lake
and each set of cross-sectional areas was fit with a line of best fit. The average slope of
the two lines (-1.47) was used to create a linear regression model to determine the distal
extent of each modeled scenario.

Figure 8: Outline of the LND gas path with points showing locations where people
were affected (Sigurdsson, 1988; Stupfel & Le Guern, 1989).
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The adapted LAHARZ model delineates inundation zones based on a given
cross-sectional area and starting point. From the starting point, a pixel in the
accumulation raster, the model maps the given cross-sectional area within the channel
for each pixel in its path. The code follows the path of steepest descent using a DEM
and an accumulation raster and continues from the chosen starting point to the edge of
the raster or given stopping point. The stopping point for each scenario was determined
by the linear regression model from the base model of the LND scenario. The starting
point for each branch of the flow was the pixel in the accumulation raster that was
closest to the lake’s edge in that drainage channel. This was done for each valley except
the valley just east of the lake, where Buabua is located. This area was affected by the
LND but is not along one of the primary drainage paths near the lake edge. In order to
map this area a pixel farther south along the valley on the accumulation raster was
chosen for each scenario large enough to affect that area. The distance into the valley
was based on the relative size of the gas flow. Though LAHARZ was designed to map
gravity flows, it was used here because the villages that were affected by the LND are
topographically lower than Lake Nyos and CO₂ is heavier than air and fills topographic
lows. The adapted LAHARZ model shows which areas would be affected by flows
with different cross-sectional areas.
The 15 scenarios modeled for this study have cross-sectional areas ranging from
5,000m² to 100,000m². The cross-sectional areas are in increments of 5,000m² for
scenarios 1 - 10 and 10,000m² for scenarios 10 - 15. Scenarios 1 - 10 have more
resolution because they are more possible than larger scenarios. Since degassing started
at the lake, the amount of gas has been reduced from the amount measured just after the
LND. The first eight scenarios have smaller cross-sectional areas than the model of the
LND done for this study. These scenarios are relatively more likely to happen than the
larger scenarios because of the reduced gas content. Scenarios 11 - 15 have a lower
possibility of happening so they are given less resolution and weight in calculating the
disaster risk.
ArcMap was used to determine the population and areas affected by each
scenario; the people and areas that could be affected by a disaster similar to the LND
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and by the 15 other scenarios. Each modeled scenario mapped in ArcMap delineated
the affected area in each case. The buffering tool in ArcMap was used to determine
how close the modeled flows come to each village. If part of the village intersects with
the flow’s buffer, it is considered to be affected and it is considered to be more greatly
affected if it is intersected by the flow itself. Using the intersect tool in ArcMap, the
houses that were partially or completely overlapped by each flow were found. The
number of houses affected by each flow was multiplied by an average household sizes
(hhs), five is the national average hhs and eight is the average rural hhs (Balgah et al.,
2016; Ngwa & Balgah, 2016).
This method for analyzing this hazard is useful because it does not require many
inputs and seems to replicate the extent of the LND gas path fairly accurately (Figure
9). This is difficult to verify since there is only one case with which to compare it and
there are not many similar disasters on which to test the method. However, this model
is simple and it covers the areas that were affected by the LND more accurately than
other, more complex models (Burton et al., 2017; Costa & Chiodini, 2015). One
downfall of the model is that it cannot model the flow of gas right near the lake. The
way the gas must have moved around the lake during the disaster is more complex than
what this model can map. It can also only model one direction and course of a flow at a
time. Several starting points were required to map the LND and each gas release
scenario.
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Figure 9: Model of the 1986 LND using the adapted LAHARZ model.

3.4 Disaster Risk Assessment
To determine DR, from LND survivor vulnerability and the gas hazard, the
resulting factors from each assessment are ranked. There are several studies which
work toward quantifying qualitative vulnerability data and there are many studies,
throughout a variety of disciplines, which attempt to quantify vulnerability (Birkmann,
2006; Cutter et al., 2008; Ferrier & Haque, 2003; Luers et al., 2003; Roberts et al.,
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2009). Though the PAR model is usually described as a qualitative model some of the
factors of vulnerability can be measured quantitatively (Birkmann et al., 2013). Roberts
et al. (2009) describe how qualitative and quantification description of vulnerability
factors are not always studied exclusively. Often considering vulnerability in both of
these ways can facilitate the understanding of vulnerability and its multifaceted nature
(Ferrier & Haque, 2003; Füssel, 2007). In this study the resulting factors of
vulnerability and how they have changed since the LND, from the PAR and Access
models, are considered both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Bollin et al. (2006) expresses the importance of being able to compare the
variety of factors contributing to DR in order to facilitate tracking changes over time. In
their study they assign each factor a number from one to three and then created a
composite score for the hazard and vulnerability. They did this because of the multitude
of factors they considered for each assessment. Since there are many factors that
determine vulnerability in the Nyos area, a composite ranking was used for each
village. Each composite ranking was based on the average (mean) of all of the
vulnerability factor rankings in a village. This study used the same type of methodology
as Bollin et al. (2006) and Nirupama (2012), who used a similar method and quantified
factors from Wisner et al. (2004)’s PAR and Access models. One of the goals of this
study is to ascertain which vulnerability and hazard factors contribute most to DR and
to inform DRR efforts and policies. In order to do this the various measurements of
each factor (i.e. scenario’s intersection with a village, condition of roads/infrastructure,
and awareness of degassing project) are ranked so that they can be compared. This was
done by assigning a value from 1 - 5, based on data from the interviews, participant
observation, and the literature, according to a set of criteria for each factor (described in
results).
For the gas hazard, the potentially affected population for each scenario is based on
the total number of houses affected. This allows the gas hazard to be ranked based on
distance from the village or extent of the village covered by the modeled gas flow.
Where, as a gas flow gets closer to a village the hazard ranking increases. Probability,
or likelihood, is an essential component to assessing risk. However, calculating or
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determining, with certainty, the probability of this hazard becoming a disaster is not
feasible due to the multitude of unknown or unsure elements involved. There has only
been one recorded gas release at Lake Nyos, the rate of the influx of gas into the lake is
not constant, and the specific trigger mechanism is unknown. The lack of confidence in
the exact nature of necessary elements used to calculate time of return or frequency
makes determining a precise probability impractical. So, in this study the hazard is
ranked without a probability. However, since probability is such a crucial component of
hazard assessments, an additional hazard ranking, a composite score including
likelihood, is determined using subjective probability.
Subjective probability is used to estimate the likelihood of an event using intuition
and experience. In this case, the likelihood of each modeled scenario was determined
based on information from the literature and the researcher’s personal opinion.
Subjective probability is often used for risk assessments, especially when there are
unknown factors or there is not enough data to determine frequency (Aven & Zio,
2011; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Cooke, 1991; Tversky, 1967). It is also used in natural
hazard and disaster risk assessments (Aven & Renn, 2009a, 2009b; Marzocchi et al.,
2004; Marzocchi & Woo, 2007; Neri et al., 2008; Woo, 1999). Many risk and hazard
assessment studies focus on volcanoes because of their complexity and unpredictable
nature (Aspinall et al., 2003; Donovan et al., 2012; Martí et al., 2008; Marzocchi et al.,
2004; Sobradelo et al., 2014; Sobradelo & Martí, 2010; Woo, 2008). The LND is
similar in its unpredictability. This is mainly due to the lack of specific knowledge on
the nature and mechanisms of the hazard. Owing to the lack of information that usually
informs disaster event probability; this study uses evidence that is known about the gas
hazard to advise the interpretation of the likelihood attributed to each modeled scenario.
It should be noted that the likelihoods used for this study are the researcher’s personal
opinion and intuition. It is known that there is less gas in the lake now then there was
just after the disaster in 1986 and that the lower gas content is due to the active artificial
degassing that is ongoing at the lake (Kusakabe, 2017). However, it is also known that
the recharge rate of the gas is variable (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994). These
elements were used to inform the researcher’s opinion when attributing likelihood to
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each modeled scenario. The concept that smaller disasters happen with more frequency
than larger disasters was also considered because of the nature of the hazard and the
way gas accumulates in the lake (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Kaplan & Garrick,
1981; Kunreuther, 1996; Merz et al., 2009).
The likelihood factors used are between zero and one so that when they are
combined with the hazard rankings to make a composite score they are still comparable
to the vulnerability rankings. This was also done so that the composite score could also
be used in the risk matrix used to exam the DR. Risk matrices are often used to
examine the likelihood and consequences of a disaster event. In this study vulnerability
is also considered in the matrix, which is sometimes done when risk matrices are used
specifically with natural hazards (Aven, 2007; Garvey & Lansdowne, 1998; Glade,
2003).

32

4.

Results and Discussion

4.1 Vulnerability Analysis
The Pressure and Release model was used to explore current unsafe conditions
in the Lake Nyos area while the Access model was used to examine the changes in
access to resources throughout the process of the 1986 LND. In this way differences in
how current access could be affected in the event of another gas release can be
investigated. Understanding the factors that create disaster risk and how those factors
may be affected by specific disaster events is essential to effective DRR, risk
management, mitigation efforts, and disaster-related initiatives. Disaster risk is created
by the interaction of one or more natural hazards and vulnerability, making it important
to consider the variables from both sides (Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2012).
Disaster risk in the Nyos area comes from vulnerabilities specific to the area and
created by root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions which developed on
the local and national levels. Vulnerabilities vary among populations due to a variety of
factors, including socio-economic status, age, gender, and access to resources. These
factors are dynamic and change as conditions and access change (Birkmann & Wisner,
2006; Wisner et al., 2004).
4.1.1 The Disaster Process of the LND
On the evening of the Lake Nyos Disaster, people in the villages were going
about their regular evening tasks. They were cooking, eating dinner, children were
playing, and many families had already retired for the evening when Lake Nyos
erupted. Many survivors described how they had no idea what was going on and
quickly became disoriented. This was due to the lack of oxygen, which was displaced
by the carbon dioxide (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter et al., 1989). One survivor
described how she became confused and did not know what was happening:
“On that day, we were out in the fields. And immediately after we
came back from the farm, we had our bath, ate, and slept. It all began
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with my baby. The baby began to stress and stretch her body. I thought,
“What is happening?” The lamp was on, then immediately, it died down
by itself. I got up and called my child and asked, “Where are the
matches? I want to light the lamp again.” I took the match and I lit it but
to no avail. Then the other children, who were sleeping, started falling
in different directions. Even the baby I was holding in my arms, fell
down and I didn’t even realize. We struggled and struggled until we
moved out of the house, not even dressed, moving around. We did not
even know what we were doing. I also didn’t know where I was going.
My senses only came back a long time after that. When my sense came
back, I realized I had been watching the children. I went back to the
house. I found the children; they were lying where they had fallen. The
ones under the bed had excreted. Then I joined all the children in the
same place. At that point we smelled something like gunpowder. The
children were breathing heavily, gasping for air. Then my husband’s
brother came down and was crying, saying that he didn’t know what he
would tell his brother about what had happened to his family. [His
family was similarly affected.] We sat there until it was morning. And
then we heard that it did not only occur in our compound but it was
everywhere in the village.”
Many people found it difficult to move and were often unable to help
themselves. Those who could, went to give help and get help from their families,
friends, and neighbors. A respondent describes how difficult it was to walk or even
move:
“So, actually what happened that night to me was that we were
sleeping. Everybody was asleep. I was not sleeping, I just lay in bed.
And all of the sudden it sounded as if there was a storm outside. At first I
thought, “Oh, we need water. I should go and get the pots so they’ll be
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outside.” Then I thought, “No, they are already outside.” And then I
worried, “Oh, I hope the lids don’t get blown away. I should go protect
them, put stones on them.” And then it occurred to me, “Oh, no, it will
be okay, they are safe outside”. So, that was the last thing I could
remember, thinking about the pots and the buckets outside. And when
the people finally came to our compound, I did not know exactly what
was happening. So, as I was gaining consciousness, I heard a woman
talking to me. And I felt as though the ground beneath me was shaking
and I was falling again and again on the floor. And the woman was still
talking to me. And when my eyes opened, I realized that I was bundled in
a blanket from inside but I was outside. And Alhagi [a title given to a
Muslim person who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca], who lives
below us was there. So, Alhagi who lives below us was one of the people
who helped drag me outside. I was wrapped in a blanket. And I could
still feel the ground under me turning and turning. And I started
vomiting. But all that I was thinking was that I was sick, that I was
recovering from a fit. So, in the morning I was unable to recognize
anybody. I opened my eyes, I could see but I was unable to recognize the
children. And I realized that all the fowls in the compound were dead.
Alhagi was making desperate attempts to reach out to people to come
and find out what is happening. That night he rushed out, fell down,
couldn’t breathe. When he recovered and regained consciousness he
rushed back to the compound and tried to go out again. He was trying to
run out that night to call people to come and see what is happening but
he was unable. He was just lucky, he would have died too. So, that
morning I was unable to stand up and I had a baby, a small child by
then. Another woman had to carry that baby. We were struggling to go
up to Alhagi’s compound up the hill from our compound. And so I was
down, kneeling down, creeping on the ground as we were going up. I
was unable to move.”
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As people started to recover, they went around checking on their families, friends,
and neighbors. Many respondents explained how they found very few people alive, so
many had died. A respondent recounts the scene that many of them found:
“Nearly all of those who survived, they went round to various
compounds to see the type of damage and people dead. They went down
to the village of Nyos to see how everyone was, they were dead. I was
just lying down I was unable to move, I was just weak, I couldn’t even
stand up. So, after two days I felt a little better and I was able to move.
So, I went down to the village of Nyos and I saw corpses thrown here
and there but I didn’t go to any Aku [an ethnic subgroup in the
Northwest Region known for being cattle grazers] man’s compound to
see the situation. I only had the opportunity to go to Nyos village and
arriving there I saw corpses thrown left and right beside the road, trees,
plantains and banana stems uprooted from the ground, their roots lying
outside. So, everywhere there were corpses. So, things were just
scattered anyhow, every living thing was motionless, was dead. Every
living thing was dead.”
One of the first NGO responders who arrived at Lake Nyos after the disaster
also describes what they saw:

“Yes, on Sunday morning, I heard that something had happened
somewhere between Kumfutu and Misaje. In that area, the valley there.
So, I happened to meet the SDO, who had also heard reports and was
preparing to go and investigate. So, I asked him whether I could join the
party and go with them. So, he accepted and I joined them. And when we
reached the level of Kumfutu, which is still high up, the whole convoy
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stopped. So, I then inquired and said that, “What happened? Why are
we stopping here?” And they said, well they don’t want to go any
further. So, I asked for permission to proceed because I saw some
people coming out of the valley. So, I reasoned with them, that if people
can come out of the valley, I could go in too. And then I went ahead and
then I reached first, Cha. Then I went to Nyos. And from there I
continued to Subum. And, so, in Cha, I met people who survived, who
had woken up and regained consciousness. And I also saw many people
who were dead there. Then in Nyos, I met also people who were sitting
there but they were not the people who had been in the village on the
night of the disaster. These were people who had come down from the
hills, so they were mostly Aku people, who had cows on top of the hills,
and who were now, you know, sitting there just… just not knowing what
to do. And of course, everywhere again, I saw dead people, dead cattle,
just no sign of life, not even a mosquito or a fly or anything. Nothing. So,
it then happened that a helicopter pilot flew over. He had also,
apparently, heard that something had happened and he flew over the
lake. He noticed me and came down and I asked him then, could he
bring me back to the point where I had left the SDO and the other
people? So, he accepted and we went back and we couldn’t see anybody
anymore at that point where I’d, where I’d left them. And so, we went
back as far as Weh, and no one was there. So, he brought me back to
Nyos and then took off and went his own way. And I continued to Subum,
where I again met people who had survived the gas eruption and
others… many of them were, dead. When I went back and I took people
with me who wanted to be evacuated, who had burns and other kinds of
injuries, I deposited them at the Wum Hospital. And then I went to see
the SDO, at his residence, at Wum Lake, and I gave my report. Then we
went together to the post office, because at that time there was no
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telephone connection or what there. There was no connection. You could
only call through the post office.”

Many survivors lost their social networks, their support systems. Family and
friends are the first place community members go to for physical help, financial
assistance, or shelter in times of hardship. Many of them also lost a significant portion
of their assets and in some cases, their entire livelihood. The LND killed many cattle
and other domesticated animals. For some survivors their livestock had been their main
source of income. A respondent describes how his life has changed from losing his
main livelihood:
“I prefer the way life was before the disaster because, by then, I had
my milk and I would drink it. And I had my cattle… I was fine then and I
did not have so many worries. But now I’m not living fine. I’m in ‘level
one’ now. I have nothing. By then I was in ‘level two’. But I’m in level
one now.”
Many survivors talked about how they felt as though they had not been able to
return to the same standard of living that they had in 1986. They often expressed their
hopes for their children. One survivor talks about his current situation and his hope that
his children might have a better life some day:
“No, I have not really gotten my life back. Maybe my children will
one day have something like that. But for now, there is nothing… Even
the house that I had before that disaster, I don’t have it now.”
4.1.2 The Progression of Vulnerability in the Lake Nyos Area
In order to understand disaster risk in the Nyos area, it is necessary to
understand the unsafe conditions present there and which are created by historic socio38

economic structures and ideologies. The root causes, dynamic pressures, and fragile
livelihoods and unsafe locations of the progression of vulnerability in the Lake Nyos
area are presented in the PAR model for the Nyos area (Figure 10). The Access model
augments the PAR model and reinforces the determination of the fragility of
vulnerability factors.

Figure 10: The progression of vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area, Cameroon, adapted
from Wisner et al. (2012).
Root causes
The vulnerability of survivors in the Nyos area is deeply embedded in the
country’s history and power structures. The anglophone regions of Cameroon have a
history of federal and national-level socio-economic and political marginalization
which has led to the underrepresentation and powerlessness of anglophone
Cameroonians (Achankeng, 2015; Akum, 2009; Vubo & Ngwa, 2001). Since
reunification, anglophone Cameroonians have felt that they were being subjugated by
the francophone federal government. In turn, this has led to a sense of cultural
nationalism among anglophone Cameroonians. The federal government, under the
guise of attempting to drive uniformity for national unity, often tries to impose the
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French systems of law, education, and other institutions on the anglophone regions
(Akum, 2009; Vubo & Ngwa, 2001). Since Cameroon is a bilingual country, all of the
francophone students are taught English and all of the anglophone students are taught
French. There is a clear difference in the level of enforcement this system receives
between the anglophone and francophone regions. Anglophone civil servants and
government agents posted in francophone regions speak French whereas francophone
civil servants in anglophone regions often speak little to no English (Akum, 2009;
Ayafor, 2005). Ideologies shaped by the region’s history and culture also affect
vulnerability in this area. Although the gas hazard represents one of the most
potentially disastrous natural hazards in the area, many community members do not
consider the gas hazard an important safety threat. When asked about their perception
of the gas hazard, many respondents expressed either that the gas hazard no longer
presents a danger or that it does not matter whether or not it is dangerous. Many
respondents believe that they will certainly die if an eruption occurs because it would
be fate:
“Well, there is nothing. I’ve just come back with only one aim in
my mind, if it is to happen, let it happen and if I am to die in that
particular incident, I will aim to die. That will be my fate.”
This fatalistic worldview is shared by many in the local communities and even
talking about the disaster is seen as asking it to happen. One respondent, living outside
of the disaster area, discusses this viewpoint:
“The only thing I can tell you is that, your conscience should be
clear because it is an emergency, something that nobody expected is
going to come. So, feel free and I beg you we should only be thanking
God. Whatever comes, whether it is good or bad, we just have to accept
it. We cannot say, this things has come as if you were expecting it to
come. It is a surprise, just like death too. Because all of us are visitors
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here, we will go back as we came. And you cannot refuse to go back
because you did not even know how you came. So, I can only say, it is
God who gives and he is the one who takes away. So, sorry. All of us are
a part of who will go, nobody will remain here. That’s all the advice I
can give you if you were to have any problem too.”
Survivors believe that there is nothing that they can do to change how they
might be affected. In conjunction with this, there is also a belief that is summed up by a
common phrase used by Cameroonians, “On va faire comment?” When the people use
this phrase they mean, “What can anyone do?” Many stated that even if they are afraid
of the hazard or think it is dangerous, they have no way, financially or physically, to
escape from a gas eruption. Many also stated the importance of living in the place
where you were born, even if it is dangerous. One survivor expresses this feeling:
“It’s just that we don’t have anywhere to go. Like, if we had a place
to go then we would not be here. That’s why, in case that lake, that thing
happens again it will only kill us. But we don’t have a place to go
because this is where we were born.”
These ideologies and beliefs discourage disaster preparedness because death is
viewed as inevitable if the disaster occurs no matter what is done in preparation. Many
respondents expressed that preparing for a disaster is pointless:
“Hmm… I don’t think, I don’t think there is anything people can do
except prayers, except prayers. There is nothing that we can do; it is
only prayers to God, little prayers to God. Yes.”
There is not much of a culture or idea of disaster and disaster preparation in
Cameroon. One of the NGO workers discusses this during their interview:
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“And I have no knowledge of whether they do anything to protect
themselves against natural disasters. There is always a question,
whether people here, in Cameroon, believe in natural disasters. When
something happens, then they try to find an explanation for that. Maybe
because of their lack of scientific knowledge, or what, but mostly they
find the causes of a disease or a natural disaster in relationships, in
relationships with other people who are still alive or in relationships
with people who have deceased already, who are dead. So, their
forefathers may be displeased because of certain things, that they have
not followed certain traditions, or what, or maybe because of jealousy
from some people against others. These they normally see as the causes
of disasters.”
Dynamic pressures
The centralized political structure delays and curtails decision-making on the
regional, divisional, and local levels. Local and regional politics are also dominated by
this centralized power structure which leads to a lack of representation for small, rural
communities like those in the Nyos area. Dynamic pressures in the PAR model are the
‘chain of explanation’ that convey the influence of historic root causes on current
unsafe conditions (Wisner et al., 2004). The Access model also considers these factors
and how access to them could change during a disaster event. Poor access to resources
has negative impacts on many aspects of village and community life and makes the
community less able to cope with a potential disaster.
There is a general lack of local institutions in the Lake Nyos area; though there
are several more schools and health clinics than there were in 1986. Shortly after the
disaster, buildings for accommodating researchers and government agents were built at
the lake (Bang, 2008). However, permanent institutions dealing with risk, disasters, and
first response are still located far from the area. Local institutions that are present
usually lack offices or official meeting places and those that do have offices are often
understaffed and ill equipped (Bang, 2012, 2013, 2014; Gaston et al., 2012). The
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government agencies that deal with natural disasters include departments specifically
dedicated to monitoring hazards posed by Lake Nyos and evaluating the conditions in
which survivors live. However, these agencies maintain little to no presence in the Lake
Nyos area. The closest offices are in Wum, about 30km from Nyos, and most of the
monitoring is done remotely from offices in Yaoundé (Bang, 2008, 2012, 2016).
Although 30km is not a long distance, due to poor road conditions and infrastructure, it
takes an hour to travel this distance in the dry season, sometimes more in the rainy
season. When asked if he believes that another disaster like the LND would be worse
than in 1986, one respondent passionately describes the poor road conditions and
unfulfilled promises of assistance:
“Yes! For example, the problem is that they said they will dig
this road, since then right up til now, they have not done it. So you see,
they have not done anything. They said they will dig this road, they have
not dug it. The road leading from here to the lake, they said they would
dig it and put tar on it, they have not done it. So all those fake promises
are never fulfilled, that is what I am trying to say. And even this road
that you used to come to this place, if not of the benefit of WADA [Wum
Area Development Authority, a local NGO], because this area was the
WADA zone, like there would be no road linking this place to other
places.”
At the time of the LND, there were no hospitals or health centers in the area.
Survivors went by foot or were taken to the hospitals in Wum and Nkambe, 30km and
63km from Nyos, respectively. When asked how long it took survivors to arrive at the
hospital and mission in Wum, an NGO worker recalls:
“Well, I can say, some two or three days. And then a week went by and
people were still coming.”
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Many people remember not knowing what was happening. They discussed how people
from other villages came to help. Respondents often spoke about waking up in the
hospital, one remembers:
“We discovered that we were in the hospital. And we did not know
what we were doing and we did not even know what had happened.
When news had circulated about the disaster, people had come from
Fonfuka, Wum, and Nkambe. They rushed to help us. They all came with
vehicles. They took some people to the hospital in Wum while others
were taken to the hospital in Nkambe.”
According to an employee at the hospital in Wum, the hospital has been made a
district hospital so that it might better assist people if another gas eruption occurs. A
health center has also been built near Subum. This increases community access to
health care. However, the clinic is within the area affected by the LND and the
community would not be able to use the facility in the event of a similar eruption.
Many people in the Nyos area do not fully understand what happened during the
disaster and the nature of the hazard (Bang, 2012, 2013, 2016). There is a lack of
training and scientific knowledge generally and regarding the gas hazard. A few
schools have been built since the disaster and, according to respondents; it is not an
easy task getting such investments for their communities. Members of the community
are usually required to buy materials and build the schools. Once the building is
complete and the school has teachers and students, the government will come and
approve it as a government school. Many respondents talked about the lack of schools
and how they struggle to get them made:
“If you look at our schools, they have been constructed by us. The
government has approved our G.S. school here, government secondary
school here.”
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This is a difficult feat to accomplish for the communities because of the
financial burden that it puts on community members. Training and scientific knowledge
is also lacking due to the corruption of some officials and normal bureaucracy of
government offices. Permission must be obtained to post information publicly or
disseminate information through schools or similar means and this permission often
requires a bribe payment (Bang, 2013; Daniel, 2016; Neneh, 2014). This keeps
information from being shared easily and freely, which contributes to the community
members’ lack of knowledge on the hazard.
After the LND, the population of the Nyos area changed completely due to the
evacuation. Several thousand survivors fled their homes and went to stay at missions,
hospitals, and even in fields in other villages (Bang, 2008, 2012, 2016). Most displaced
survivors lived away from the disaster area for the following two years in temporary
tent camps. One NGO worker describes the areas where the displaced survivors stayed
for those two years:
“The whole [Nyos] valley was then out of bounds. And then, of
course, the question came up, “Where do we put these people?” So, at
the mission, in Wum, St. Martins, there was a former domestic science
school, which we didn’t use anymore. So, it was decided that it should
be offered to put up people. Fields were made available, where you see
the health center now. That was a field. So we put up the area with tents.
We had the parish hall, which was made available. They made available
the field in Kumfutu, where there was an out station. So, a small church
community there, a school, and a field. Those were made available too.
So, all that happened in just the week after the disaster.”
In 1988, almost two years after the disaster, the government and local missions,
with assistance from international aid, built resettlement camps where survivors could
be permanently relocated. Some of these camps were built next to villages where
survivors had stayed during the two year period while others were built next to villages
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closer to the lake. Although many survivors stayed away from the Lake Nyos area,
some moved back to their homes shortly after the disaster and others followed when
they faced difficulties in the resettlement camps. A respondent discusses how many
people have moved back to the villages around Lake Nyos:
“I think the life in Subum was better. That’s why people are
going back there. Or if the life in this camp was better for them, they
would have not been going back there. For here we don’t even have our
farming lands. If you even have the farming lands, the lands are ill fed.
So, there is nothing good in this place. That is why most of them are
going back there. We want to get the population of those who are living
here and those who are going back there. So, that population of those
going back there are more that those who are staying here. All of those
who are living here, they are still farming but up there. So, there is
nothing good here.”
Another respondent describes life in the resettlement camp, how aid was
unevenly distributed, and why he and others decided to move back to the Lake Nyos
area:
“[The government would] usually bring us food and other items,
like blankets and sometimes when they come, to the head of each family,
they will give him some amount of money like 5,000, which is not even
enough. They will give him 5,000 francs to run for the whole week. And
you don’t even know what to do, it is not even enough. Then they will
stay away for like 12 months and then they will come again, they will
bring food stuffs like rice, beans… In fact they usually just bring food
and throw it to us like we are fowls. The way you feed fowls, you throw
the food on the ground, they come and pick and eat. That is how the
government usually comes. Then after that they came with some cattle.
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They gave people cattle too, but we, most of us who are living this way,
nobody received a single cow. But other survivors, like those who were
in Upkwa and in Kumfutu and Esu, they all received cattle from the
government. Even some people in Kimbi and Ipalim also received cattle.
But those of us who are around this area, did not receive anything like
that. And the government, by that time, tried to explain to us why it
happened like that. They said that, “Why did we move out of the place
that they gave us?” We told them that our cattle are dying where they
kept us and we cannot sit and watch them die, meanwhile we have other
places that we can take them to. That is why we decided to move out.”
During the two year period between the disaster and the building of the camps,
people moving into the area found empty houses with farm land and took up residence
there. Later, this barred many survivors from returning to their ancestral homes near the
lake so they had to stay in the camps or move to different villages (Bang, 2009; Bang &
Few, 2012).This also happened in the resettlement camps. Several interview
respondents living in camps indicated that houses vacated by their neighbors when they
returned to the disaster area were taken over by people attempting to take advantage of
incoming aid.
When survivors were resettled in camps most families were given a 30m² plot
of land and a house. The spacing and size of each parcel of land does not provide
sufficient space for farming and restricts local farmers’ choices in what crops they grow
(Bang, 2009, 2012; Bang & Few, 2012). Even survivors who live in the villages near
the lake or have found space elsewhere choose to grow crops that they are sure will
grow and that their family will use. In some cases, resettlement camps were built on
land that was already being used by other cattle grazers or farmers. This, in addition to
poorly defined field and pasture borders, has caused significant discord between
farmers and grazers (Bang, 2008, 2012). This can be even worse in areas where there
are semi-nomadic cattle grazers who do not use defined grazing pastures. One
respondent describes how serious this conflict is in some areas:
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“As we are here, the cows do not allow us to farm. They are
everywhere. We cannot even farm next to our own houses because the
cows come and eat everything. And there is nothing that we can do. If
we try to tell anyone [in the government or city council], the Mbororos
[an ethnic group who are nomadic cattle herders] come and kill that
person. There is one boy here who is about to go to Wum because they
killed his brother. Cows ate his crops and he wanted to tell someone, so
they beat him and killed him. We can work a small piece of land in front
of your door and you still won’t be able to eat.”
There is ongoing ethnic discrimination in the area that is rooted in the region’s
history but is exacerbated by the lack of arable land. Several interview respondents, like
the one quoted above, described how this or that ethnic group was part of the reason
their living situations are not as good as they could be. There was blame being placed
on farmers’ or cattle grazers’ ethnicities as being the cause of the farmer/grazer conflict
(Bang, 2009; Pelican, 2006, 2008). Some respondents also described how various
ethnic groups benefited more or less than another from the resettlement and aid that
was distributed after the disaster. Sometimes this is tied to the ongoing conflict and
terrorism happening in neighboring countries. Some respondents, when approached as a
possible interviewee, expressed suspicion of people from outside the area or other
strangers. Some talked about their fear that agents from terrorist groups or refugees
from conflict zones would come to the area since they live so close to the border with
Nigeria.
Fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations
Fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations are the direct links between a disaster
and the deeper causes of socially produced vulnerability. They are the most evident
factors because they apply directly to the resources and functions of daily life and
livelihoods. Communities in the Lake Nyos area rely mainly on agriculture; subsistence
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farming and cattle grazing are the two primary occupations. Community members have
limited land and limited access to land on which to farm and graze their cattle,
especially in the resettlement camps. One respondent who has moved back to the Nyos
area stresses the limited space available for farming:
“As we were in Kimbi, it was the government that was feeding us,
paying for everything. As for me, on my own part, I’m telling you what I
know, I was just doing farming on a smaaalll piece of land.”
This has compelled many survivors to move back to the disaster zone. Some
moved back because they were able to farm on their original fields and others moved
because of more fertile soil and available land (Balgah et al., 2016; Bang, 2012).
Many survivors of the LND report that their health has not been the same since
the disaster and because they are older and do not have the strength or endurance that
they used to. Life expectancy in Cameroon is about 55 years (CIA, 2017) and those
interviewed were all at least 30 years old, many were much older. Several interview
respondents expressed that they would not be able to escape a disaster if it depended on
their strength or moving quickly. They said that they would just have to wait for it to
come since they wouldn’t be able to run.
Many people in the area complete grade school and sometimes at least part of
secondary school. After school most of them become farmers or cattle grazers, learning
by helping their parents in the fields (Balgah et al., 2012; Bang, 2008). Those who are
able to go to cities have more opportunities for training in skills other than farming and
cattle grazing (Balgah et al., 2012).
People in the Lake Nyos area, especially if they are survivors of the disaster,
have limited social networks. Family members, relatives, and neighbors usually make
up a person’s social network but survivors of the LND lost many of these people in the
disaster, either through death or separation (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2016; Bang &
Few, 2012). In times of hardship, the first place people in the area go is to this social
network for assistance (Fleischer, 2007). Respondents described how they ran to
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relatives and neighbors for help when the disaster happened. Many survivors can no
longer do this; they have had to create new social networks since the disaster. This has
not been easy for them to do because they were moved into the resettlement camps
where the neighbors living in the houses on either side of them could be from a
different village, religion, ethnic group, or even speak a different native language
(Pelican, 2006). It was also difficult because of increased social tension over farming
and grazing land (Bang, 2012).
Local market access is hindered by poor roads and infrastructure as well as low
income levels which keep people from traveling. Due to poor road conditions and lack
of income available for travel and transport, vendors from outside the area rarely come
through and local farmers with produce to sell are rarely able to travel to markets where
there could be improved access to buyers. Communities around Lake Nyos, especially
in the resettlement camps, have limited land for agriculture and economic factors that
tie people’s livelihoods to the land affect local markets. The lack of physical locations
and structures are due to the lack of local investments. However, the lack of buying and
selling is caused by lack of crop diversity and poor transport. One respondent expressed
discontent with government aid and the state of market roads:
“I think in 2012, they came with some food items, some blankets,
some mattresses, and gave people here. But, I, for one, don’t consider
that as, as a good help. Because if the government really wants to help
they would select some few children from this area and sponsor [them to
go to school]. There is even no farm to market road, even if the
government can help us to open up this road [motions to BuabuaFundong road], I think it will pass through Fundong to here. You’ve
seen the nature of the road. So, if the government was to do that or if the
government did that we’d have been very happy. I would not cry of my
poverty here again. Everything, everything does well here [crops grows
well]. But there is no means to transport it to the market.”
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A majority of community members are farmers and they grow crops that do
well in the environment and that they will use in their households (Amin & Manga,
2010; Ngwa & Balgah, 2016). Community members would rather not than spend
money on produce they already grow or can grow for themselves. Subsistence farmers
also rarely buy produce because they grow many of the same crops and have even less
disposable income (Amin & Manga, 2010). The lack of income also causes a lack of
job diversity and opportunities. People are not able to risk what little they have in order
to invest in a new venture or opportunity.
In most places in Cameroon, even in some larger cities, formal credit is almost
nonexistent; items must be paid in full before they can be taken home. Banks do
provide loan services but have very stringent guidelines for borrowers (Mayoux, 2001).
These services are rarely available outside of larger towns and cities and are not usually
financially accessible to rural farmers (Balgah et al., 2012; Bime & Mbanasor, 2011a,
2011b). Common forms of credit used locally are njangis and tontines. These are
groups formed by community members and are a way to save money and also to get
access to loans in times of financial need. A respondent describes why so many people
in the community use njangis:
“My reason for playing Njangi is that, as I am like this now, if I
have two hundred francs in my hand, I will go and play it in the njangi.
Because it can happen tomorrow that I’m sick. I can go to the njangi
house and say, “Let them assist me.” They can decide to give me even
five thousand for me to use and go to the hospital. Or even if it might be
my child who is sick, I will just rush to the people and say, “Please, my
sisters, assist me. You know I usually come and play njangi here. Please,
assist me and give me money.” They will easily decide and give me
money to take my child to the hospital.”
The exact terms of the group are decided by the members, i.e. the order and
timing of loans given out, the interest rates on loans, etc. (Bime & Mbanasor, 2011a,
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2011b). Another respondent explains how each member contributes a small amount of
money to the total to be handed out as loans:
“Yeah. I sold my planks. I have a hundred francs, I go and play
there every country Sunday [local day for resting]. Like yesterday was a
country Sunday. When we receive this money we will send our children
to school. Like now we have recently shared the njangi, then we are
starting back again.

Sometimes when you have an accident or an

emergency you can rush there and then collect some money to solve the
problem or you go and buy your medicine. So we play in the njangi
every country Sunday and Sunday is 100 francs.”
Often group meetings are also a social opportunity for the members and food
and drink are shared. Many of these groups run without issue however there is a great
deal of distrust between people when it comes to dealing with and handling money
(Azibo & Buchenrieder, 2011). This makes it difficult for some groups because of the
interest rates and loan pay back times they impose and the action taken when someone
cannot or does not pay back their loan on time. This is the main way of gaining access
to credit in the camps and villages, so many community members belong to a njangi or
tontine.
Before the LND there was very little in the way of disaster preparedness and
though this has increased since the disaster, there are not many emergency service
workers or offices kept in the Nyos area (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016; Bang &
Few, 2012; Le Guern et al., 1992; Shanklin, 1988; Tchindjang, 2018). There is also not
a strong social protection network setup in the area. Most government offices and
resources dealing with disaster preparedness and social protection are at least an hour or
more away by car. This, in conjunction with poor road conditions, makes it difficult for
emergency responders to get in and out of the area and for community members to
reach or have access to these types of resources.
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4.1.3 Vulnerability Ranking
Each factor in each village was considered individually and was determined by
participant observation data, interviews, and literature. The factors were ranked from 1
- 5, where generally 1 represents a factor that was not discussed as significantly
contributing to the survivors’ vulnerability due to excellent access to the resource
and/or the factor was discussed as something of very low concern or importance to the
respondents, 2 represents good access to the resource and/or was described as being of
low concern or importance, 3 represents fair access to the resources and/or of moderate
concern or importance, 4 represents mediocre access to the resource and/or of high
concern or importance, and 5 represents poor access to the resource and/or of very high
concern or importance. All of the vulnerability factors considered are summarized and
ranked in Table 1. The factors that are root causes are not included because they are too
deeply ingrained and require significantly more in depth study to be cover thoroughly
within the scope of this study.
Cha and Buabua generally ranked higher in all the factors because they do not
have the same access or same quality or quantity of resources as Nyos and Subum.
They rank higher in societal deficiencies than Nyos and Subum because Nyos and
Subum are located on the Ring Road and have easier access to certain resources
through transportation and services that come along the road. The Ring Road is the
main access road through the Northwest Region. Cha also sits on this road but has no
health clinic or market like Subum and no school or several hundred meters of
improved road like Nyos. This is the same case with the macro forces. Cha and Buabua
have higher rankings because factors such as ‘farmer/grazer conflict’ and ‘ongoing
ethnic and linguistic discrimination’ were discussed more often and respondent’s
expressed their significance in the community.
Since Nyos and Subum are on the Ring Road they are easier to reach than
Buabua. This means that they receive more visitors, government and NGO assistance,
and local government investment. Buabua also typically ranks higher than Nyos and
Subum because there is little to no infrastructure there. Buabua has a market structure
but little buying and selling happens there, the roads are very poor, and there is no cell
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phone reception. In the villages on the Ring Road cell phone reception is sometimes
available. Cha also ranks higher than Nyos and Subum because it is a smaller village
and only recently began the process of building its own market. The occasional market
that is held in Nyos and the weekly market in Subum help those villages attract buyers
and sellers from nearby who bring some money to these villages.

Table 1: Ranking of vulnerability factors. Factors are ranked from 1 - 5, 1 being
excellent access and/or of very low concern, 2 being good access and/or of low
concern, 3 being fair access and/or of moderate concern, 4 being mediocre access
and/or of high concern and 5 being poor access and/or of very high concern.
Nyos

Cha

Subum

Buabua

4

5

3

4

3

5

5

4

Local investments

3

3

3

5

Local markets

3

4

2

5

4

5

4

5

5

5

5

4

3

3

4

5

2

4

2

3

2

5

2

4

Dynamic pressures
Local institutions
Training/scientific
Societal
deficiencies,
lack of

knowledge

Infrastructure and
maintenance
Rapid population
displacement/change
Change in local
demographics
Macro-forces

Ongoing ethnic and
linguistic
discrimination
Farmer/grazer conflict
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Poor governance and

4

4

4

5

3

3

2

3

Nyos

Cha

Subum

Buabua

Lack of arable land

1

4

1

5

Lack of water

1

3

3

1

Lack of crop diversity

3

3

3

5

Dangerous location

5

5

4

3

Poor infrastructure

4

4

4

5

Fragile health

3

3

3

4

4

5

4

4

3

4

3

5

5

5

5

5

Poor access to market

3

4

3

5

Low income levels

3

5

4

5

4

5

5

5

2

4

3

4

4

4

4

4

corruption
Ongoing
conflict/terrorism in
neighboring countries
Fragile livelihoods and unsafe conditions

Natural
resources

Physical
resources

Human
resources

Limited skills and
formal education
Marginalized groups or

Social resources

individuals
Limited social
networks

Economic
resources

Limited access to
formal credit
Lack of job diversity
and opportunities

Political

Lack of disaster

resources

preparedness
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5

5

5

5

3

5

3

3

89

116

93

115

3.30

4.30

3.44

4.26

Poor social protection
Poor
government/communit
y relationship/trust
Total
Average (mean)

Considering the vulnerability assessment alone, the survivors in Cha are the most
vulnerable of the population interviewed for this study. However, this changes once the
assessment of the gas hazard is taken into account. It should also be noted that
vulnerability is not constant; it is continually changing as different factors are changed
or addressed.

4.2 Hazard Analysis
4.2.1 Scenario Models
By analyzing the social vulnerability and exposure to the gas hazard a disaster
risk profile can be created for the villages in the Nyos area. The social vulnerability of
many survivors in villages where interviews were conducted has increased since the
LND. A few improvements have been made in some areas though many still do not
have sufficient access to basic resources and secure livelihoods. The mapping and
scenario modeling show that a gas release similar to the LND could affect
approximately the same number of people as in 1986. In 1986, about 5,700 people
either died or were affected by the disaster. The population affected by the base model
created for this study was 3,655 to 5,848 people. There were 731 houses that intersected
with the LND base model. The modeled scenarios show that even smaller scenarios
could affect many people if they occurred. Each run of the scenarios also indicates that
the distance the gas travels has more impact on the potentially affected population than
the cross-sectional area of the gas. The grade of the valley walls usually lead people to
build along the valley floor rather than on the slopes. Due to the slope of the valley
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walls, an increase in the cross-sectional area of the flow would mainly extend
vertically. This means that the distal extent of the gas flow, which is calculated using
the average slope of the regression model and which extends horizontally, covers more
of the populated space.
Figures 11 - 25 show the 15 modeled scenarios with the gas flow depicted as
orange polygons and the AOI outline in red. The village of Nyos is affected in every
scenario, Cha is affected by 14 of the 15 scenarios, Scenarios 4 - 15 affect Subum, and
Scenarios 5 - 15 affect Buabua.

Figure 11: Scenario 1 with 5,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 12: Scenario 2 with 10,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 13: Scenario 3 with 15,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 14: Scenario 4 with 20,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 15: Scenario 5 with 25,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 16: Scenario 6 with 30,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 17: Scenario 7 35,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 18: Scenario 8 with 40,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 19: Scenario 9 with 45,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 20: Scenario 10 with 50,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 21: Scenario 11 with 60,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 22: Scenario 12 with 70,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 23: Scenario 13 with 80,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Figure 24: Scenario 14 with 90,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.

Figure 25: Scenario 15 with 100,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI.
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Table 2 shows the number of houses and population range affected by each
modeled scenario. Scenario 1 affects 35 houses and almost 200 people even though it is
a relatively small gas release scenario. The largest scenario, Scenario 15, could affect as
many as 14,000 people, some as far as 40km from the lake.
Table 2: Number of houses and population range affected by each modeled scenario.
Population
Scenario

Cross-sectional area

Houses affected

affected
(hhs 5-8)

1

5,000m²

35

175 to 280

2

10,000m²

119

595 to 952

3

15,000m²

171

855 to 1,368

4

20,000m²

243

1,215 to 1,944

5

25,000m²

457

2,285 to 3,656

6

30,000m²

480

2,400 to 3,840

7

35,000m²

530

2,650 to 4,240

8

40,000m²

552

2,760 to 4,416

9

45,000m²

747

3,735 to 5,976

10

50,000m²

808

4,040 to 6,464

11

60,000m²

1,061

5,305 to 8,488

12

70,000m²

1,142

5,710 to 9,136

13

80,000m²

1,226

6,130 to 9,808

14

90,000m²

1,669

8,345 to 13,352

15

100,000m²

1,750

8,750 to 14,000

One assumption made when calculating the affected population for each
scenario was that all of the houses that were mapped are currently occupied. This is one
of the reasons why the affected population is presented as a range. The other reason is
to take into account unevenly distributed population; five is the national average
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household size in Cameroon and eight is the rural average household size (Balgah et al.,
2016). By considering this range of household sizes, the likely best and worst case
scenarios can be examined. Additionally, for the houses to be considered as affected
had to intersect with the extent of the actual modeled scenario rather than the 500m
buffer used for the hazard ranking criteria. This was done so that the potentially
affected populations were less likely to be overestimated.
4.2.2 Hazard Scenario Ranking
Each scenario was considered based on severity and ranked from 1 - 5. Table 3
shows the hazard ranking and criteria used for severity.
Table 3: Hazard ranking and criteria.
Hazard
Ranking
Catastrophic
Major
Moderate

Numerical

Description of Criteria

Ranking

Completely covers more than
one major center of the village.
Completely covers one major
center of the village.
Intersects with part of the
village.

5
4
3

Comes within 500m of the
Minor

village without intersecting with

2

the village.
Negligible

Does not come within 500m of
the village.

1

Since probability is an important aspect of hazard assessment and is difficult to
determine for this hazard, a subjective likelihood was used. Table 4 shows the hazard
ranking for each village along with the subjective likelihood for each scenario. The
hazard rankings in Table 4 only include the severity from the hazard ranking criteria.
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The rankings which include the subjective likelihood are shown in Table 5. When only
the hazard is considered, Nyos has the highest risk. This is because it is catastrophically
affected by every modeled scenario, based on the ranking criteria. After Nyos, Cha is
the most vulnerable village when considering only the hazard risk since it is
catastrophically affected by all but the first scenario.
Table 4: Ranking of scenarios, based on the 1 - 5 scale of the hazard ranking criteria,
along with the subjective likelihood used to calculate the composite hazard ranking in
Table 5.
Hazard Severity
Ranking and

Likelihood

Nyos

Cha

Subum

Buabua

Scenario 1

5

1

1

1

1.00

Scenario 2

5

4

1

1

0.95

Scenario 3

5

5

1

1

0.90

Scenario 4

5

5

4

2

0.85

Scenario 5

5

5

5

3

0.75

Scenario 6

5

5

5

3

0.65

Scenario 7

5

5

5

3

0.55

Scenario 8

5

5

5

4

0.45

Scenario 9

5

5

5

5

0.35

Scenario 10

5

5

5

5

0.25

Scenario 11

5

5

5

5

0.15

Scenario 12

5

5

5

5

0.10

Scenario 13

5

5

5

5

0.08

Scenario 14

5

5

5

5

0.05

Scenario 15

5

5

5

5

0.03

Probability
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(Subjective)

When the hazard ranking is combined with the subjective likelihood, Nyos still
has the highest hazard risk. A subjective likelihood was used because probability is
very important when assessing hazards and risk but there is a lack of historical data and
other information that does not allow a probability to be calculated for the gas hazard.
By using a subjective likelihood, the DR can still consider the likelihood of each
modeled scenario.
Table 5: Hazard ranking (Severity x Subjective Likelihood).
Hazard Ranking

Nyos

Cha

Subum

Buabua

Scenario 1

5.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Scenario 2

4.8

3.8

1.0

1.0

Scenario 3

4.5

4.5

0.9

0.9

Scenario 4

4.3

4.3

3.4

1.7

Scenario 5

3.8

3.8

3.8

2.3

Scenario 6

3.3

3.3

3.3

2.0

Scenario 7

2.8

2.8

2.8

1.7

Scenario 8

2.3

2.3

2.3

1.8

Scenario 9

1.8

1.8

1.8

1.8

Scenario 10

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

Scenario 11

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

Scenario 12

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

Scenario 13

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

Scenario 14

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Scenario 15

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

4.3 Disaster Risk
The LND caused affected families the loss of many of their assets, resources,
and in some cases their entire livelihoods. The results of the modeling show that if any
of these scenarios was to occur many people could be affected. It is important to
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consider both the hazard and vulnerability when examining disaster risk. As shown
above, the most at risk village changes depending on which aspect is focused on. The
DR presented here considers both assessments. It is important to consider the likelihood
of a disaster event occurring, however, this is a very complex and little understood
aspect of this hazard. So, a subjective likelihood was used to provide a composite
hazard ranking that was also used to calculate DR including likelihood. The disaster
risk is determined from the vulnerability and hazard analyses and shows which villages
where survivors are living are at higher risk if any of the modeled scenarios were to
occur.
A risk matrix was used to evaluate the disaster risk (Table 6), where the hazard
and vulnerability rankings were multiplied together. The risk matrix also provides a
non-numerical representation of the DR for each village. The matrix is color coded with
green representing low risk, yellow representing medium risk, and red representing
high risk. One DR is calculated without the subjective likelihood (Table 7) and one is
calculated which includes the subjective likelihood (Table 8).
Table 6: Matrix used for disaster risk.

Disaster
Risk Vulnerability

Hazard

1
2
3
4
5

1
1
2
3
4
5

2
2
4
6
8
10

3
3
6
9
12
15

4
4
8
12
16
20

5
5
10
15
20
25

DR without likelihood:
DR=H x V, where DR is disaster risk, H is the hazard (severity), and V is the
vulnerability.
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DR with likelihood:
DR = H x V, where DR is disaster risk, H is the hazard (severity and likelihood),
and V is the vulnerability.
Tables 7 and 9 show that as the severity of the hazard increases DR for the LND
survivors living in the Lake Nyos area also increases. This also shows that without
considering probability the larger scenarios become the priority for any DRR efforts.
Due to the nature of the Lake Nyos gas hazard, gas release scenarios quickly become
catastrophic and without probability the hazard appears to affect the DR more
significantly than vulnerability. Without considering probability, DRR efforts would
likely focus on the hazard. Tables 8 and 10 account for probability with the use of the
subjective likelihood and give a more accurate idea of which combination of hazard and
vulnerability factors should be the focus of DRR efforts. As the scenarios get larger,
they become less likely which reduces the overall risk.
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Table 7: DR ranking, including hazard without likelihood.
Hazard & Vulnerability Nyos Cha Subum Buabua
Scenario 1

16.5

4.3

3.4

4.3

Scenario 2

16.5

17.2

3.4

4.3

Scenario 3

16.5

21.5

3.4

4.3

Scenario 4

16.5

21.5

13.8

8.5

Scenario 5

16.5

21.5

17.2

12.8

Scenario 6

16.5

21.5

17.2

12.8

Scenario 7

16.5

21.5

17.2

12.8

Scenario 8

16.5

21.5

17.2

17.0

Scenario 9

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3

Scenario 10

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3

Scenario 11

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3

Scenario 12

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3

Scenario 13

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3

Scenario 14

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3

Scenario 15

16.5

21.5

17.2

21.3
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Table 8: DR ranking, including hazard (severity x likelihood).
Hazard & Vulnerability
Nyos Cha Subum Buabua
(including likelihood)
Scenario 1

16.5

4.3

3.4

4.3

Scenario 2

15.7

16.3

3.3

4.0

Scenario 3

14.8

19.3

3.1

3.8

Scenario 4

14.0

18.3

11.7

7.2

Scenario 5

12.4

16.1

12.9

9.6

Scenario 6

10.7

14.0

11.2

8.3

Scenario 7

9.1

11.8

9.5

7.0

Scenario 8

7.4

9.7

7.8

7.7

Scenario 9

5.8

7.5

6.0

7.5

Scenario 10

4.1

5.4

4.3

5.3

Scenario 11

2.5

3.2

2.6

3.2

Scenario 12

1.6

2.1

1.7

2.1

Scenario 13

1.2

1.6

1.3

1.6

Scenario 14

0.8

1.1

0.9

1.1

Scenario 15

0.4

0.5

0.4

0.5

Tables 9 and 10 show the disaster risk, non-numerically for each village based
on the risk matrix classification.
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Table 9: Disaster risk (without likelihood) in the Nyos area, by village and scenario.
Disaster Risk
Nyos
Cha
Subum
Buabua
Scenario 1

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Scenario 2

High

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 3

High

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 4

High

High

High

Medium

Scenario 5

High

High

High

Medium

Scenario 6

High

High

High

Medium

Scenario 7

High

High

High

Medium

Scenario 8

High

High

High

High

Scenario 9

High

High

High

High

Scenario 10

High

High

High

High

Scenario 11

High

High

High

High

Scenario 12

High

High

High

High

Scenario 13

High

High

High

High

Scenario 14

High

High

High

High

Scenario 15

High

High

High

High
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Table 10: Disaster risk (with likelihood) in the Nyos area, by village and scenario.
Disaster Risk
Nyos
Cha
Subum
Buabua
Scenario 1

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Scenario 2

High

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 3

High

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 4

High

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 5

Medium

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 6

Medium

High

Medium

Medium

Scenario 7

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Scenario 8

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Scenario 9

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Scenario 10

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Scenario 11

Low

Medium

Low

Medium

Scenario 12

Low

Low

Low

Low

Scenario 13

Low

Low

Low

Low

Scenario 14

Low

Low

Low

Low

Scenario 15

Low

Low

Low

Low
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations
Disaster risk assessments are an integral part of effective disaster risk reduction.
By assessing local hazards and vulnerability, the deeper causal factors of disaster risk
can be more effectively addressed. Disaster risk is not a constant state but an ever
changing, dynamic condition. The disaster risk calculated for this study shows the
disaster risk in the Lake Nyos area at the time of the study. The results of this study
show that if an equivalent gas eruption to the LND were to occur today, it would affect
approximately the same number of people as in 1986. Although this is not likely with
the degassing system that is in place, it gives an idea of what could happen if the
system is not maintained. The adapted LAHARZ model utilized in this study seems to
accurately map the areas that were affected by the LND and possible inundation zones
for the 15 modeled scenarios. When compared with other models used to map the 1986
LND gas flow, the adapted LAHARZ model is able to map the flow pattern more
accurately than some of the more complex models. This model also shows that even a
relatively small gas release could potentially affect many people, which again
underlines the importance of considering both the hazard and vulnerability for effective
and sustainable DRR.
As long as the degassing system is well maintained the hazard seems to be
under control. This makes it important to consider additional disaster risk reduction
efforts in the area in the event that there is a system failure. The survivors in the
villages and camps near the lake are vulnerable due to a variety of social factors. The
disaster risk can be reduced by addressing some of these factors. Income and access to
resources, relationship with government and aid, and social relationships were found to
have a strong bearing on the socially produced vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area. The
lack of disaster preparedness, emergency management offices, and first responder
presence and agency should be addressed. The presence and agency capacity of these
offices should be increased in order to be more effective and accessible during a
disaster event. Infrastructure and road improvement would allow first responders and
response agents to have enhanced access in and out of the area and would also allow
community members to evacuate more easily. By addressing these factors, disaster
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response can be made more efficient while also helping to improve local community
members’ access to physical and

social

resources.

Government/community

relationships and trust are more difficult to improve and are much more difficult to
regain once lost. However, to help possibly improve and reduce further impairment of
these relationships, community participation and input should be utilized and
considered in future DRR and mitigation efforts. This may improve both community
understanding of the gas hazard and participation for project efficiency.
Future research could also help to further clarify the factors that contribute to
risk, vulnerability, and hazards. A more detailed analysis could be done focusing on the
general population of the area and could examine what might be done for the survivors
not living in the Nyos area. This area is also affected by more than just the CO₂ hazard.
Future studies could focus on one of the other hazards or all the hazards together and
both qualitative and quantitative risk analyses could also be done for those hazards.
Interdisciplinary studies and cooperation could also be beneficial in adding to the level
of knowledge and understanding of the interaction of various social factors and hazards
in the area.
The first piece of disaster preparedness and risk reduction is defining and
analyzing hazards and vulnerabilities of potentially affected populations. Although all
hazards and vulnerabilities should be addressed, resources are often limited. In this
way, conducting hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessments, which consider a broad
range of factors, can be used in establishing priorities on what can and should be
addressed through disaster risk reduction efforts. As exemplified in this study, it is
crucial that risk from both hazards and vulnerability be examined. When only one
aspect is considered, risk reduction and mitigation efforts taken may only partially
address or may misdiagnose the most significant causal factors and immediate needs of
a population. By considering risk through the assessment of both vulnerability and
hazards, the actions taken can more effectively and efficiently reduce disaster risk as
well as more appropriately integrate with a population’s, community’s, or country’s
larger development goals.
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7. Appendix A – Interview Information [IRB project
#799717-1]
A1. Informed Consent: Oral Model
English Version
*Note: Written as it will be read to the participant by the translator.
Mary Witucki is a graduate student at Michigan Technological University in the United
States. She is conducting a study at her school to write her thesis and complete her
master’s degree in Mitigation of Natural Hazards. And I am Useini Musa; I am
collaborating and translating for this study. We would like to talk to you about the
Grassroots Strategies of Relief and Adaptation of the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster
survivors; in order to find out about how the survivors and the descendants of the
victims and survivors managed and adapted after the disaster and what they have done
to protect themselves from future disasters. Your participation in this study is
completely voluntary. There is no compensation for participation in this study. The
interview will take between thirty minutes and one hour though it may run longer if you
so choose. We would like to tape record our conversation, so that we can accurately
record your responses. You may ask us to turn the machine off or back on again
according to your comfort.
You may ask us questions at any time and talk about things you think we should know
about, even if we don’t ask. You should feel free to interrupt us if you want to ask
questions about the Grassroots Strategies of Relief and Adaptation of the 1986 Lake
Nyos Disaster survivors. You are not required to talk to us or to answer our questions.
Even if you decide now to talk to us, you may later ask us to stop asking you about it.
You may stop participating at any time. Nothing bad will happen to you or to us if you
decide not to answer our questions.
We will not reveal anything that you say to us beyond anyone helping us with the study
whom we trust to maintain your confidentiality. We will do everything we can to
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protect your privacy, but there is always a slight chance that someone could find out
about our conversation.
We are asking if you would agree to participate in this study, and to talk to us about the
Grassroots Strategies of Relief and Adaptation of the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster
survivors. Do you agree to participate? Will you allow us to record our conversation?

A2. Interview Questions
English Version
Getting to know the interviewee:
1) Are you a survivor of the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster or a relative of a victim of the
disaster?
a. Where were you living at the time of the disaster?
2) About how old are you?
Awareness of:
Disaster3) Can you tell me about what happened during the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster?
a. What do you think caused the disaster?
b. Do you consider Lake Nyos to be dangerous? Why or why not?
Government activities4) Can you tell me about what the government did and has done, if anything, since the
disaster?
a. Are they still doing anything or have they done anything recently?
Other activities5) What can you tell me about government or other activities, if any, that have been
going on at the lake since the disaster?
a. If there have been activities, have any been going on recently or are any going on
currently?
6) Have you been back to the disaster zone since the disaster happened?
a. Why or why not?
b. Would you like to move back there if you had the opportunity?
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After/since 1986 LND:
Response/Relief/Adaptation7) What did you, personally, do or what did your family and your community do when
the disaster happened?
a. What prompted you to do those things?
8) What did you, personally, do or what did your family and your community do to
manage and to restart after the disaster?
a. Why did you decide to do those things rather than something else?
b. Do you feel that you and/or your family have been able to recover from the
disaster?
Preparation/Adaptation/Risk and Vulnerability Reduction9) Is there anything that you or your family and your community have done to prepare
for future natural hazards or disasters?
a. If yes, what? If no, why not?
b. How did you come to make those decisions?
c. Due to those preparations, do you feel that you, your family, and your community
could better handle a natural hazard or disaster now?
10) What, if anything, have you been doing to make sure that you are not as affected if
another disaster happens?
a. What prompted you to decide to do those things?
b. If no, why have you decided not to do anything?
Closing:
Is there any more information that you feel would be relevant to our research?
Are there some people that you think might be willing and useful for us to talk to?
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8. Appendix B – Copyright Permissions
B1. Permission for Use for Figure 3.
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>

(no subject)
2 messages

Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>
To: ochavisual@un.org

Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:19 PM

Mary Witucki
mwitucki@mtu.edu
12/05/2018
ochavisual@un.org
To whom it may concern:
I would like to ask your permission to use the following image in my master’s thesis concerning
natural hazards in Cameroon.
Cameroon: Location Map (2013)
My name is Mary Witucki and I am a master’s student at Michigan Technological University. I am
writing my thesis on disaster risk and natural hazards in Cameroon. I would like to use this image in
my work, with full credit.
If you agree with the terms as described above, please sign and return the letter to me, specifying any
credit line, fees, or other conditions you require. Your signing of this letter confirms that you own the
copyright to the above described material. If you do not currently hold the rights, I would appreciate
any information that can help me contact the rights holder.
I would be very grateful for your permission. If you require any additional information, do not
hesitate to contact me at mwitucki@mtu.edu.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
OCHA-Visual <ochavisual@un.org>
To: Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>

Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 9:23 AM

Dear Mary,
Thank you for your inquiry. You are hereby granted non-exclusive rights subject to the
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conditions below to republish the following OCHA map:

‘Cameroon: Location Map (2013)’
Available at https://reliefweb.int/map/cameroon/cameroon-location-map-2013
And in attachment
In your thesis on disaster risk and natural hazards in Cameroon.
The following conditions apply:
1. OCHA maps must be republished in their original form and cannot be modified without the
express permission of OCHA. Modification includes, without limitation, removing, resizing, or
otherwise altering a map's title, contents, legend, symbology, acknowledgements,
attributions, or disclaimers. An OCHA map may be reduced in size at the discretion of the
Requestor provided the original spatial proportions are maintained.
2. The following attribution ("Attribution") must accompany OCHA maps: "Map provided
courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs". The Attribution must
be clearly readable. The Attribution may appear alongside the map or elsewhere in the
publication, so long as a link to the Attribution on pages where an OCHA map appears is
provided.
3. The following disclaimer ("Disclaimer") is clearly readable on each page where an OCHA
map appears: "The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map
do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations". Should the
Requestor reduce the size of the map so that the Disclaimer appearing in the map is no
longer clearly readable, the text of the Disclaimer must be reproduced and appear alongside
the map.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us at ochavisual@un.org.
Kind regards,
Design and Multimedia Unit
Strategic Communications Branch
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
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B2. Permission of Use for Bang (2010, 2016).
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>

Request for permission to cite and quote
3 messages

Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>
To: hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk
Bcc: Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>

Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 3:05 PM

Mary Witucki
mwitucki@mtu.edu
11/18/2018
Dr. Henry Bang
hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk
Dorset House D236, Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, Poole, BH12 5BB
Dr. Bang,
I would like to ask your permission to cite and quote your following publications, with full credit (no
figures, charts, graphs, tables, photos/pictures, or illustrations will be used):
Bang, H., 2010. Natural Disaster Risk, Vulnerability and Resettlement: Relocation Decisions
following the Lake Nyos and Monoum Disasters in Cameroon. PhD Thesis. School of International
Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
Bang, H., 2016. 30 Years After the Lake Nyos Disaster: What Prospects for Rehabilitation and
Reintegration in the Region? Disaster Management, Social Vulnerability, Risk Perception and
Relocation Decisions in Cameroon. US: Book Venture Publishing.
My name is Mary Witucki and I am a masters student at Michigan Technological University. I am
writing my thesis on disaster risk and I am examining the Lake Nyos area and the 1986 Lake Nyos
Disaster as a case study. Your many works on the subject have been very helpful in aiding my
understanding of the topic. I would like to include citations and quotations from the above material in
my thesis, with full credit.
If you agree with the terms as described above, please sign and return the letter to me, specifying any
credit line, fees, or other conditions you require. Your signing of this letter confirms that you own the
copyright to the above described material. If you do not currently hold the rights, I would appreciate
any information that can help me contact the rights holder.
I would be very grateful for your permission. If you require any additional information, do not
hesitate to contact me at mwitucki@mtu.edu.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Mary Witucki
mwitucki@mtu.edu
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Henry Bang <hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk>
To: Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>

Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 9:35 AM

Hi Mary,
Thanks for your mail.
I hold the copyrights for both materials and grant you permission to use them.
Regards!
Henry
Dr Henry N Bang (BSc, MSc, MSc, PhD)
Research Fellow/Lecturer
Disaster Management Centre
Bournemouth University
Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow,
Poole, Dorset,
BH12 5BB
United Kingdom
Email: hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk
Phone: +44 (0) 1202966307

Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu>
To: Henry Bang <hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk>

Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 9:40 AM

Dr. Bang,
Thank you so much! I really enjoy and am inspired by your work. I am so grateful for your
allowing me to use them!
Sincerely,
Mary Witucki
mwitucki@mtu.edu
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B3. Copyright Information for Wisner et al. (2004).

96

B4. Fair Evaluation Documentation for Wisner et al. (2012).
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